Metaphysics: Substances & Their Attributes

Substances are the subject of the four explanations and are the concrete, existing beings we encounter in life. Insofar as a substance exists, it is a composite of form and matter, caused by something, and possessing causal powers for specific, intrinsic ends. Form and matter are a substance’s internal principles since they undergird the composition of a substance, while causality and teleology are external principles since those causal powers and ends manifest outside the substance. Form and telos are perhaps the most notable of the four explanations. This is because the form (AKA nature) of a substance provides explanatory power for what and how a substance has what it has regarding its matter and causality while teleology explains why it has that matter and causality. Further, teleology tells us what is good for a substance by virtue of its form. We will return to this latter point in another post; however, as we have already noted, substances reach their fullest actuality when they reach their natural ends, and those natural ends are grounded in their nature.

Also, substances inherently possess their causal powers and ends versus having them extrinsically imposed. For instance, a daisy flower is a substance, intrinsically possessing its powers and ends, such as the power to absorb sunlight for the end of obtaining food. We call the forms of these substances’ substantial forms, since their forms are intrinsically grounded, rather than extrinsically imposed. On the other hand, a crown of daisy flowers strung together is what we might call an artificial form, by virtue of its form being extrinsically imposed. A daisy crown possesses the power to communicate peace and love for the purpose of obtaining world peace; however, there is nothing intrinsic to this artifact that possesses these properties and ends because the form from which they proceed is extrinsically imposed and depends on the more fundamental, substantial form of a daisy. Examples of substantial forms and artificial forms are numerous. For the former, we have minerals, plants, animals, and human beings; for the latter we have bricks, daisy crowns, taxidermized deer heads, and wax figurines of Elvis Presley.  

Further, substances do not exist in other things, but rather exist in their own right; they are the receivers of change, permanence, diversity, and unity. On the other hand, the attributes of substances are the givers of change, permanence, diversity, and unity in a substance. Thus, just as form and matter are applications of act and potency respectively, so too are attributes and substance applications of act and potency respectively. Attributes can include quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, condition, action, and being acted upon. For instance, a human (substance) has the attribute of weighing 139 pounds (quantity), with black hair (quality), that has a child (relation), who is at the grocery store (place) in the afternoon (time), bending over (posture), wearing clothes (condition), picking up (action) a box of cereal while being tugged to leave the store by their child (being acted upon). In such a situation, such attributes are acts actualized by the substance, and the substance remains in potency to take-on new acts/attributes, such as standing upright, moving to a new location, etc.

Finally, attributes can be distinguished between contingent and proper attributes. The latter directly flows from the form of a substance, while the former does not. For instance, the skin color (quality) of a human being is a contingent attribute, but to have skin (condition) at all is a proper attribute of a human being. As an aside, this is why racism is irrational on a philosophical analysis. For to make skin color X a matter of superiority or inferiority to that of other skin colors, is to directly associate a contingent attribute with the substantial form of a human being. But contingent accidents do not flow from a substance’s substantial form. Therefore, skin color has nothing to do with the substantial form of a human and thus has no relevance to superiority or inferiority amongst substances of the same substantial form. A light-colored and dark-colored human share the same substantial form.